A fraud-resistant method for the inspection and counting of mail-in ballots, and for permanent storage of envelopes and ballots for public viewing. To be used at the precinct level.
This method will provide election transparency, and increased public confidence in election results.
Proposed Fraud-Prevention Methodology for counting of mail-in ballots:
1)The inspection and counting will be open to poll watchers and to the public.
2)Separation of ballots from their envelopes. The ballots, still in their envelopes, will be separated into groups of 50; next, their envelopes will be removed; then, the ballots and envelopes from each group of 50 will be put into two separate, uniquely-numbered boxes… one box for ballots, the other for envelopes. From this point on, each pair of boxes… one containing 50 ballots, the other containing 50 envelopes… will remain paired for perpetuity, including when the boxes go to storage.
So… just as in the old system… no ballot can be matched with any particular envelope… thereby protecting our legacy of the legally-mandated secret ballot. However, under the Paired-Box system, any fraud that is detected will be known to have originated from among a particular group of 50. Although the offender is unknown, it will be exponentially easier to correct the problem, than it would be if the fraudster were totally anonymous among the entire voting population.
3)Inspection. The inspection process of the first batch of 50 ballots and its corresponding batch of 50 envelopes, will begin. It will be done by multiple poll workers, and viewed by the public.
Note: the above-mentioned inspection occurs before the vote-counting process. They are two separate processes.
Any pair of 2 boxes in which suspect ballot(s) or envelope(s) is(are) discovered, will have the suspect document(s) attached to the outside of the box. After the remainder of the contents of the 2 boxes have been inspected, all current action on this pair of boxes will stop, until the offending document(s) can be inspected by election professionals.
4)Repairing of discovered fraud. If one or more of the suspect document(s) is(are) found to be, in fact, fraudulent, then all of the 50 voters associated with the 2 boxes must re-vote.* In this manner, the fraudulent vote has been isolated even without having a method to identify the perpetrator(s) of the fraud… thereby maintaining our legacy of the secret ballot.
In this manner, election integrity and the secret ballot are both protected. Under the old system, discovery of a fraudulent envelope(s) would be useless, because we can’t make everyone in the county re-vote. Under the new system, we only have to require a relatively small number of people to revote, in order to eliminate fraudulent votes.
*NOTE: Although a fraudulent envelope WOULD require a re-vote, a fraudulent ballot would not, since the offending ballot could just be removed and not added to the final vote count. Because the integrity of the election has been restored by the removal of the offending ballot, a re-vote would be optional; the only purpose would be to attempt to discover the street address used by the perpetrator.
5)Storage. After inspection and counting, all boxes will be security-taped and placed in a secure storage facility for perpetuity. Public viewing will be available. Whenever security tape is removed from a box for viewing, afterward a new security tape will be put on the box, and both old and new security tape numbers will be written on the box and recorded in a master file.
6)Identifying and viewing your ballot. Any voter who wishes may contact election authorities with the serial number of his/her ballot, in order to ensure it was counted and not misplaced; the voter may view an electronic image of his/her ballot, or travel to the storage facility to physically view the ballot.
7)Future expansions to Paired-Box Ballot Counting. The above Methodology is the bare-bones version; possibilities for expansion of the program are virtually endless.
Below are examples:
—a)Electronic viewing of the inspection and counting processes, by the audience. The inspection and counting processes could be displayed, in close-up, on overhead monitors for the benefit of the audience. The monitors would be large enough so that the tiniest details of ballots and envelopes could be easily discerned. Audience members would be allowed to videorecord the monitors during the entire process; or, audience members could request (for a fee) copies of in-house recordings.
Thusly, the public in attendance at the ballot-counting would have the same close-up view of the ballots and envelopes as the poll workers and poll watchers… and also, would have the option of possessing of the same videorecorded permanent record as the county office of elections.
—b)Alternatives to separation by hand. The separation of ballots/envelopes could be done by machine, in the event there are complaints about the process being done by poll workers. (Who might see how someone voted.) Or, other creative methods could be devised whereby workers never see the front of the envelope that contains the address, during the separation process.
—c)Computerized lists of non-valid addresses. Poll workers and poll watchers… and any member of the public who wishes… could be in possession of computerized lists of vacant lots and other non-valid addresses that potentially could be used for the production of fraudulent votes.
Conclusion: Two methods for implementation of the Paired-Box Ballot Counting Initiative, should it be approved.
Should this ballot initiative be passed into law by the voters of ____________ county, here is how it will be entered into the books:
1)As a law, if there is no ruling in existence by a state, federal, or other authority, that prevents its implementation.
2)If such a ruling exists or is made, then the law will enter the books as a resolution, until such time as the ruling is repealed; at that time the resolution will revert to a law, and will be implemented.